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A cardinal principle of medical
ethics is that calling for free and
informed consent in all types of
experimental situations in which
a human being is the subject of
the experimentation. This principle was eloquently affirmed in
the articles of the Nuremberg
Code, I in the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki of the World Health Organization,2 in the code of the
American Medical Association
adopted at the 1966 convention,1
and in the "Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Hospitals."4 It is a principle at the
heart of traditional Jewish and
Christian medical ethics, and is a
principle time and again affirmed
by the magisterium of the Roman
Catholic Church.·i It is, as Paul
Ramsey terms it, a primary "canon of loyalty" demanding the allegiance of every human being in
every situation in which one human being is the experimenter
and the other his "co-adventurer"
in the experiment.6
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At the heart of this principle,
I believe, is the belief that human
beings are beings of moral worth.
By a being of moral worth I
mean an entity that is the subject
of inalienable rights that are to
be recognized by other entities
capable of recognizing rights and
that demand legal protection by
society. By a being of moral worth
I mean an entity that is valuable,
precious, irreplaceable just because it exists. By a being of
moral worth I mean a being that
cannot and must no t be considered simply as a part related to
some larger whole.
This is not the place to show
the truth of this belief that, in
my judgment, informs the principle of free and informed consent/ Still it is inst ructive to observe that recently the philosopher Roger Wertheimer expressed
the same point by referring to
what he termed "Standard Belief," that is, the belief that " being human has moral cachet; viz.,
a human being has human status
in virtue of being a human being
(and thus each human being has
human status) ." 8 According to
this Standard Belief membership
in the human species is a morally
significant fac t,9 and because being human has " moral cachet" it
follows, as R amsey has so simply
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yet eloquently put it, that "no
man is good enough to experiment upon another without his
consent."! O
Yet there are instances-and
these are by no means rarewhen it is impossible to obtain an
adequately informed and free
consent from the person who is
himself to be the subject of the
experiment. What can be done,
what ought to be done, in such
cases when the subject, whether
by reason of age, mental infirmity, or physical condition, is unable to give consent in his or her
own behalf?
There is no serlO us debate
among authorities, whether medical, legal, or moral, in cases when
the experiment in question is designed to secure some benefit for
the person who is to be its subject, when the experiment is
"therapeutic" at least in a broad
sense. 1I In cases of this kind consent to the experiment can be
given by others (parents, guardians, etc.) in behalf of persons
incapable of giving consent for
themselves. Writers speak in this
connection of "proxy" or "presumptive" or "vicarious" consent,
and there is unanimity that in
therapeutic sit u a t ion s such
"proxy" consent is morally justifiable.
Some Reflections on the Debate
But there is serious debate, at
least among moral authorities,
about proxy consent in the nontherapeutic situation. Richard
McCormick, the noted Jesuit
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moral theologian currently serving as Kennedy Professor of
Christian Ethics at the Center for
Bioethics of the Kennedy Institute, recently observed that here
there are "two identifiable schools
of (moral) thought ... The first
is associated with Paul Ramsey
and is supported by William E.
May. The second is the position
of [Charles] Curran, [Thomas]
O'Donnell, and myself."! 2 My
purpose here is to offer some reflections on this debate in the
hope that by doing so the deeply
significant human values at stake
will be clarified. I propose (1) to
outline the position taken by
Ramsey early in the debate; (2)
to summarize the position advocated by McCormick; (3) to note
the objections that I originally
raised to this position; (4) to look
at the reply to these objections
given by McCormick; and (5) to
present some new reflections.
In his Patient as Person Ramsey first noted that some forms
of non therapeutic experimentation might not, in fact, "harm" a
child (or other human subject incapable of giving consent in his
own behalf). Yet he argued that
nontherapeutic experimentations
-that is, experimentations not
intended to be of benefit to the
subject but rather intended to
advance scientific knowledge or
benefit persons other than the experimental subject! 3 - constitute
"offensive touching" and thus
"wrong" the subject.!4 In developing his position Ramsey wrote as
follows:
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To attempt to consent for a child to
be made an experimenta l subj ec t is
to treat a child as not a child. It is
to trea t him as if he we re an adult
person who has consented to be come a joint adve nturer in the common cause of medi cal research. If
the grounds for this are alleged to
be the presumptive or implied con sent of the child, this must simply
be ch a racterized as a violent a nd a
fa lse presumption. Nontherapeutic.
non-diagnostic experimentation in volving human subj ects must be
ba sed on true consent if it is to pro ceed a s a human enterprise. No
child or a dult incompe tent can
choose to become a participating
membe r of medical unde rta kings,
a nd no one else on ea rth should decide to subject these people to investigations having no rel ation to
the ir own trea tment. Tha t is a can on of loyalty to them . This they
claim of us simply by be ing a human child or incompe tent. When he
is grown , the child may put away
childish things and become a true
volunteer. This is the meaning of
being a volunteer; tha t a man enter
and esta blish a consensual rela tion
in some joint venture for med ical
progress. I i

In Patient as Person Ramsey
also observed that when we use
the term "proxy consent" to
designate the human act involved
in decisions to authorize therapeutic experiments on children
and incompetent adults, the "consent" involved is in some degree
a "false" consent. He noted that
to construe or presume consent in
such cases we are by no means
doing violence to the human being in whose behalf the "consent"
is given, but he insisted that there
was a degree of falsehood in using
this expression. 16 His intent, I
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believe, was that it is simply false
to say that a child or incompetent
adult is himself "consenting" to
the therapeutic experimentation.
In his original essay on "Proxy
Consent in the Experimental Situation" ]7 McCormick first sought
to find in the moral theory of
such philosophers and theologians
as J. de Finance, G. de Broglie,
G. Grisez, and John Finnis the
ultimate justification of "proxy
consent" in the therapeutic situation. The heart of his argument,
as he has himself recently restated it, is as follows : "if we analyze
proxy consent where it is accepted as legitimate-sci!. in the
therapeutic situation-we will see
that parental consent is morally
legitimate because, life and health
being goods of the child, he would
choose them because he ought to
choose the good of life. In other
words, proxy consent [in the
therapeutic situation] is morally
valid precisely insofar as it is a
reasonable presumption of the
child's wishes, a construction of
what the child would wish could
he do so. The child would so
choose because he ought to do so,
life and health being goods definitive of his flourishing."l s
In other words, McCormick
sees the ultimate justification of
"proxy consent" in the therapeutic situation in the reasonableness of the presumption that the
child or other incompetent would
himself consent to the experiment
if he could, and that he would
consent because he ought to do so.
McCormick then applies this
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reasoning to the non t herapeutic
situat ion. H ere he is at pains to
reject any " utilitarian evaluation
of children's lives that would submit their integrity to a quantityof-benefits calculus far beyond
any legitimately constructed consent."19 Yet McCormick holds
that there might be some types
of non therapeutic situations in
which the consent of the child or
other incompetent could be reasonably presumed, if one accepts
the analysis t hat he has provided
of the rationale behind justifiable
proxy consent in the t herapeutic
situation. Here his position, as recently summarized by McCormick
himself, can be expressed in this
way :
Once proxy consent in the therapeutic situation is analyzed in this
way, the question occurs: a re there
other things that the child ought,
as a human being, to choose precisely because and insofar as they
are goods definitive of his wellbeing? As an answer to this question
I have suggested that there are
things we ought to do for others
simply because we are members of
the huma n community. These are
not precisely works of charity or
supererogation (beyond what is required of all of us) but our personal
bearing of our sha re that a ll may
prosper. They involve no discernible
risk, discomfort or inconvenience,
yet promise genuine hope for general benefit. In summa ry, if it can
be argued that it is a good for all
of us to share in these experiments,
and h e nce that we ought to do so
(social justice), then a presumption
of consent where children are involved is reasonable, and proxy consent becomes legitima te. 2o

In ot her words McCormick first
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argues that there are moral ob- , .
liga tions t hat all of us ("we")
have as members of the human
community to contribute to the
"general benefit," i.e., the common good when doing so would
entail no "discernible risk, discomfort, or inconvenience." Since
children and other incompetents
are members of the human community, one could then reasonably presume that t hey would of
themselves, if they could, choose
to participate in nontherapeutic
experiments, precisely because
the child or other incompetent
"ought to want this not because
it is in any way for his own medical good, but because it is not (a)
in any realistic way to his harm
and (b) represents a potentially
great benefit to others."21
Justifying Proxy Consent
It is very important to note, I

believe, that McCormick's justification of proxy consent to nontherapeutic experiments on children and other incompetents that
involve no discernible or minimal
risk 22 is inherently dependent for
its validity on his analysis of the
rationale justifying proxy consent
in the therapeutic situation. In
my original essay on this subject
t his was the precise point that I
sought to stress. With Ramsey I
believe that the term "consent,"
when applied to those instances
when others give consent to an experiment on a human being who
is himself incapable of giving consent, is in some degree false. I
therefore argued that the justification of "proxy consent" in the
therapeu tic situat ion in no way
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required us to "construct" t he
consent of the child or other incompetent by inferring that he
would, if he could, consent to t he
experiment precisely because he
ought to do so if he is to manifest
the love for the good of life and
health that is required of human
subjects. Rather I argued that the
basic justification for "proxy consent" in the therapeutic situation
was grounded in the moral obligations incumbent on parents and
other adult members of the human community to do what they
could to protect the real goods of
life and health when these were
being imperiled in human beings
who were themselves incapable of
protecting these goods in themselves. 23 In articulating my justification for proxy consent in the
therapeutic situation I appealed
to the Kew Gardens Principle as
articulated by Jon Gunneman,
Charles Powers, and John Simon
in their The Ethical Investor.2 4
According to this principle, we
(that is, responsible adult human
beings who are properly speaking
moral beings or moral agents)
have an obligation to do something in behalf of our fellow human beings when they are in need
of help, when we are aware of the
peril they are in (proximity),
when we have some capacity to
come to their assistance (capability), and when they will surely suffer or be deprived of some
basic human good unless we take
effective action (last resort) .2,
Here I want to note that I
could have, and perhaps ought to
have, appealed to the moral theoMay, 1976

ry of Germain Grisez to justify
" proxy consent " in the therapeutic situation inasmuch as it
was to this theory that McCormick appealed in articulating his
own position. 26 Hence I now wish
to call attention to this theory
and the way it ought to be applied, in my judgment, to the issue of proxy consent in the
therapeutic situation.
According to the moral theory
of Germain Grisez and the other
writers to whom McCormick appeals, the human good is pluriform, that is, it consists of a set
of real goods constitutive of what
we can call the whole or total hul11an good, and these goods are
real and not merely apparent because they are inherently related
to real needs rooted in our being.
Among these goods are life and
health. Neither life nor health or
any of the basic human goods is
the supreme good or summum
bonum, but each is a real good of
real human beings and each, . as
known, functions as a principle of
practical reason or what we could
call a principle of intelligent behaviorY
There are several ways, according to this theory, in which the
basic human goods that give rise
to affirmative moral principles
bind us. In his articulation of this
theory Grisez distinguishes five
modes of obligation. I shall note
them here and simply point out
that the third mode of obligation
that he distinguishes is precisely
the mode of obligation at stake in
the therapeutic situation when
the human subject is himself in77

capable of giving consent. According to Grisez the basic modes of
obligation are the following:
In the first place, all of these goods
hind us at least to this, that we take
them into account. In our practical
reasoning, we must h a ve a perma -

nent sensitivity to the essential
goods to whi ch primary principles
direct. An attitude of simple disregard for anyone of them reveals
that we have set ourselves against
it. Therefore, such an attitude is incompatible with our basic obligation to pursue and to act for it.
In the second place, everyone of
the goods dema nds of us that, when
we can do so as easily as not, we
avoid acting in ways which inhibit
its realization and prefer ways of
acting which contribute to its reali zation. This p rinciple never can be
ap plied legalistica lly , but nevertheless its use is quite common in practice in ordinary moral arguments.
.. . In the third place, everyone
of the goods demands of us that we
make an effort on its behalf when
its significant realization in some
person is in extreme peril. This obligation. . frequently binds with
great force . . . This type of obligation binds in degrees varying with
the seriousness of the stake, the
immediacy of the peril, and the opportunity we and others have for
giving aid ....
In the fourth place, everyone of the
goods demands of us that we do not
act directly against its realization . . . .
Still another, the fifth way, in which
the values establish obligations is
that each one of them demands of
us that we keep our engagements
with it. We do not have a general
obligation to seek out opportunities
for promoting eve ryone of the
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goods. But we should pursue something good, and each person according to his individual aptitude must
choose the values he will try to promote .... 28

It ought to be obvious, r believe, that the third mode of obligation is the mode of obligation
at stake in situations when socalled "proxy consent" is given in
the therapeutic situation. It is
simply a way of stating the "Kew
Gardens Principle" adopting the
moral theory of Germain Grisez,
the moral theory to which McCormick appealed in articulating
his position.
To summarize at this point. r
believe that the basic reason why
it is morally legitimate for a parent or other adult to "consent" to
allow his child or other incompetent human being to participate
in a therapeutic experiment is
simply that the consent in such
cases is an exercise of proper
moral responsibility by a moral agent of the obligation that
he has to promote the good of another human being when this good
is imperiled and he has the capacity of doing something about
it. There is no need for him to
construct the child's wishes or to
presume that the child would of
himself consent to the procedure
if he could because of any moral
obligation on his part to do so.
r objected to the position of McCormick inasmuch as I thought
that his analysis of the justification for proxy consent in the
therapeutic situation was inaccurate and, a fortiori, that his
analysis of the justification for
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proxy consent in the nontherapeutic situation was erroneous. I
claimed that his position requires
one to treat a child or other incompetent moral individual as a
moral agent, something that a
child or other incompetent, simply by being a child or incompetent, certainly is not. 29
In commenting on the objections brought against his position
McCormick made two points. His
first was that the position he articulated does not "necessarily regard the infant as a moral agent.
Nor need it," he wrote, "imply
that he has obligations. It need
only suggest that what it is reasonable and legitimate to do experimentally wit h youngsters
might be constructed off what
others who are moral agents
ought as humans to do; for
though they are not yet moral
agents, infants are humans in the
fullest sense. "3 0
As far as the first element in
McCormick's first point is concerned-namely that his position
need not imply that an infant has
moral obligations-it seems to me
that in articulating his position he
not only implied that the infant
has moral obligations but asserted
that he did. For he wrote: "proxy
consent is morally valid precisely
insofar as it is a reasonable presumption of the child's wishes, a
construction of what the child
would wish could he do so. The
child would so choose because he
ought to do SO. "31 If this is not to
presume or infer or construct
moral obligations existing in the
May, 1976

child, then I have difficulty in
grasping what it is.
Further Observations
With respect to McCormick's
claim that his position "need only
suggest that what is reasonable
and legitimate to do experimentally with youngsters might
be constructed off what others
who are moral agents ought as
humans to do ; for though they
are not yet moral agents, infants
are humans in the fullest sense"
I would like to offer the following
observations.
With McCormick I believe that
infants and adult incompetents
are humans in the fullest sense.
But I believe that we need to
make some distinctions when we
speak of what we as humans
ought to do. I believe that I do
not, precisely as a human being,
as a member of the human species, have any moral obligations.
Yet I do believe that I am, precisely as member of the human
species, as a human being, a being of moral worth , an image of
God, a being of whom it is written
"Does a woman forget her baby
at the breast, or fail to cherish the
son of her womb? Yet even if she
forgets, I will never forget you.
See, I have branded you on the
palms of my hands" (Is 49:1516) . As a human being, as a
member of the human species, I
am radically capable of becoming
a moral agent, a being with moral
obligations, but in order for me
to become such an entity I need
help of the human community.
Let me now try to explain why,
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and why I believe this character
of our existence is so central to
the issue of proxy consent in the
nontherapeutic situation.
No one in this room-no human being anywhere--was a
moral being or moral agent at
birth. No one in this room, no
human being anywhere, was a person or personal subject at birth,
if by person or personal subject
one means a self-conscious entity
aware of itself as a self, as an enduring subject of experiences, capable of communicating with
other persons, other selves, and
capable of distinguishing between
is and ought. Empirical evidence
is relevant and determinative
here. There have been, for example, recorded instances of feral
or "wolf" children, that is, human
infants separated from a human
community quite early in their
lives who were then reared by animals such as wolves or bears.
When these human offspringbeings certainly human by reason
of their membership in the human
species and in my judgment (and
in Christian faith) infinitely precious beings imaging the living
God-were found by other human
beings and brought back into the
human community, it was evident
that they did not have any realization or awareness of themselves
as selves. They totally lacked the
concept of selfhood-indeed they
were completely incapable of entertaining any concepts. They
were, in brief, quite oblivious to
their own identity as human beings and obviously they were in

80

no way bearers of moral obligations.
What this fact (and others like
it) does, I suggest, is to make us
acutely conscious of the social
solidarity of human existence.
They show us that human existence, as a personal existence, is
inescapably and necessarily a coexistence, or to use a biblical expression, that human existence is
convental in character. To be human in the sense that to be
human means being personal and
being a self aware of its responsibilities is to exist with other human beings. But for us to exist
with other human beings we must
first be granted leave by them to
exist with them. Personhood, in
other words, is a gift. It is, in a
very real sense and in one respect,
a gift that each one of us receives
from other human beings (although ultimately God is the
source of our personhood). It is
a gift that we receive, directly and
immediately, from the parents
who conceived us in an act that
was at the very same time, one
hopes, an act expressive of the
love they had for one another,
and it is a gift that we continually
are called upon to bestow on one
another. My being me depends, in
a very real way, on your being you
and allowing me to be me. An indispensable prerequisite for our
becoming persons is the help of
the human community. We must
first be recognized by that community for what we are, namely
beings of moral worth, if we are
to grow into personhood.
Perhaps I could express someLinacre Quarterly

what more clearly what I have in
mind if I reformulate somewhat
the strikingly perceptive formulation of the Golden Rule suggested
by Roger Wertheimer in the essay
to which I referred earlier. 32 I
submit the following: You, a moral being (i.e., a personal subject
capable of rational reflection and
of exercising moral responsibility
and of being the bearer of moral
obligations) are to do unto others
(i.e., other members of the human
species, other beings of moral
worth) as you, a member of the
human species and a being of
moral worth, would have others
(i.e., other moral beings, other
personal subjects capable of rational reflection and of exercising
moral responsibility and of being
the bearers of moral obligations)
do unto you, a member of the human species, a being of moral
worth.
Apply this now to the instances
when "proxy consent" is at stake.
In the therapeutic situation those
human beings who have become
moral agents and bearers of moral
obligations (and have become so
because they have at least been
allowed to be and have been in
some way recognized for they
really are by the human community) find themselves faced
with a moral obligation to do
what they rightly can to help one
of their fellow human beings (a
being of moral worth) participate
in the true human goods of life
and health. In the non therapeutic
situation, the same human beings
are stilI required to recognize in
an infant or other incompetent
May, 1976

human being the reality that is
present to them and demanding
of them that it be recognized as
the entity that it really is. To authorize that this human being
participate in an experiment that.
is in no way related to his own
well-being and in which he is required to participate simply
because he can provide an indispensable ingredient for the experiment to work is, I submit, an
act that ruptures the convenantal
bonds that ought to exist in and
among human beings, for it is to
regard this human subject, this
being of moral worth , either as an
impersonal "it" or as a bearer of
moral obligations, neither of
which he is.
To put it another way, I believe
that proxy consent in nontherapeutic situations is morally unjustifiable precisely because it
strikes at the very heart of the
belief or supposition that lies behind the principle of free and informed consent to begin with,
namely that human beings are all ,
simply by reason oi their membership in the human species, beings
of moral worth and as such entities that transcend the communities in which they exist.
"Offensive Touching"
A second point that McCormick raised in commenting on the
objections raised to his position
was the following: " At some point
the discussion must come to grips
with the fact that Ramsey's position (,offensive touching')-the
one preferred by May-could not
allow any non therapeutic experimentation whatsoever, even the
81

most trivial such as a bucca!
smear or routine weighing."33 Let
us seek to come to grips with this.
A buccal smear, as I understand
it, is tissue taken from human
cheeks for examination. I do not
know whether such buccal smears
are routinely done on infants, but
if so, I believe that one ought seriously to question the practice unless it is being done to help or
in some way benefit the infants
whose cheek tissue is being used
for examination. Similarly, if the
weighing of infants is in no way
related to their well-being, then
why is this act performed? Surely
anyone of us, and I would imagine McCormick would here be
included, would be "offended" if
someone were to take tissue from
our cheeks or put us on a scale
simply out of curiosity and with out asking our permission. It
would be an affront to our dignity, to our humanity. Infants, I
submit, and McCormick agrees
with me here, are humans in the
fullest sense and ought to be respected as such. If a buccal smear
or weighing is in no way related
to their own well being, are they
not being offensively touched?
Does the inoffensiveness reside
simply in the minds of those who
perform such acts, and is this not
the result of their own insensitivity? Does it represent the proper "care" that human beings who
are moral agents ought to exercise
in behalf of those human beings
who are not? Could such activity
be made to conform to the Golden
Rule as herein articulated?
The suggestion has been made
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that the position taken by Ramsey and me is too individualistic
and does not give serious attention to the social character of our
existence.34 I believe that quite
the contrary is true. I agree fully
with McCormick when he speaks
of the responsibilities that " we"
have as members of the human
community to do our part to contribute to the general benefit or
common good. The obligatory
character of these responsibilities
is indeed extremely stringent, as
a careful consideration of the
third mode of obligation of which
Grisez speaks would indicate. But
I submit that our responsibilities
toward the human community in clude the obligation that "we,"
that is, moral agents and moral
beings, have to protect the integrity and inviolability of those
beings of moral worth who are
fully our fellow human beings but
who are not, precisely because
they are children or incompetents,
our fellow moral agents charged,
with us, with the responsibility to
contribute to the general benefit.
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